Competition Fosters Trust by Huck, Steffen et al.
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Competition Fosters Trust
Huck, Steffen; Ruchala, Gabriele K.; Tyran, Jean-Robert
Publication date:
2006
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Huck, S., Ruchala, G. K., & Tyran, J-R. (2006). Competition Fosters Trust. Cph.: Department of Economics,
University of Copenhagen.
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
DISCUSSION PAPERS 
Department of Economics 
University of Copenhagen 
 
 
 
 
06-22 
 
 
Competition Fosters Trust  
 
Steffen Huck, Gabriele K. Ruchala,  
and Jean-Robert Tyran  
 
 
 
 
 
Studiestræde 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K., Denmark 
Tel. +45 35 32 30 82 - Fax +45 35 32 30 00 
http://www.econ.ku.dk 
 
 
 Competition Fosters Trust 
 
 
STEFFEN HUCK, GABRIELE K. RUCHALA AND JEAN-ROBERT TYRAN 
 
November 2006 
Abstract 
We study the effects of reputation and competition in a stylized market for 
experience goods. If interaction is anonymous, such markets perform poorly: 
sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not trust sellers. If sellers are 
identifiable and can, hence, build a reputation, efficiency quadruples but is still 
at only a third of the first best. Adding more information by granting buyers 
access to all sellers’ complete history has, somewhat surprisingly, no effect. On 
the other hand, we find that competition, coupled with some minimal 
information, eliminates the trust problem almost completely. 
 
 
Keywords:  Experience Goods; Competition; Reputation; Trust; Moral hazard;  
  Information conditions 
JEL Codes:  C72, C92, D40, L14 
 
Authors 
Steffen Huck 
Department of Economics & ELSE 
University College London 
Gower Street 
London WC1E 6BT 
United Kingdom 
phone: +44-207-679-5895 
e-mail: s.huck@ucl.ac.uk 
Gabriele K. Ruchala 
Department of Economics 
University of Erfurt 
Nordhäuser Str. 63 
99089 Erfurt 
Germany 
phone: +49-361-737-4582 
e-mail: gabriele.ruchala@uni-erfurt.de 
Jean-Robert Tyran 
Department of Economics 
University of Copenhagen 
Studiestræde 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen  
and  
CEPR, Goswell Road, London  
phone: +45-353-23-027 
e-mail: jean-robert.tyran@econ.ku.dk 
 
Huck acknowledges financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) via ELSE, Ruchala 
acknowledges financial support from the University of Erfurt, Tyran acknowledges financial support from the 
Department of Economics at the University of Copenhagen. 
 
  1
                                                
1. Introduction 
Lack of trust and moral hazard are widely seen as serious impediments to economic 
efficiency and growth. In this paper, we study two remedies against these obstacles: 
reputation and competition. Using experimental methods we isolate the partial effects of both 
and obtain surprisingly unambiguous results. Identification of sellers, as a prerequisite for 
reputation building, has strong positive effects but fails to overcome the moral hazard 
problem. Adding more information by granting buyers access to all sellers’ complete history 
has, somewhat surprisingly, no effect. With full public information efficiency remains at just 
around 30%. On the other hand, we find that competition, coupled with minimal information, 
eliminates the trust problem completely. As long as buyers can identify sellers, competition is 
sufficient to achieve almost full efficiency.  
We implement a repeated binary trust game that resembles a market for an experience 
good with a fixed price where the seller can only choose quality.1 We vary the amount of 
information that buyers can access about sellers’ past quality choices and study treatments 
with and without competition. Without competition, buyers are in each period randomly 
assigned to sellers. With competition, buyers choose in each period the seller from whom they 
want to buy. It turns out that the introduction of competition is greatly effective. With choice 
of sellers market efficiency rises from a meager 30% to over 80%.  
Regarding the market’s informational structure, we start with treatments where buyers 
only know the identity of different sellers and remember their own experiences with sellers 
from whom they have bought in the past.2 We refer to these treatments as treatments with 
“private information”. On the other hand, we study treatments with “full information” where 
buyers know all past quality choices of all sellers. With private information, sellers can build 
some limited reputations vis-à-vis their own past customers. With full information, sellers can 
build much stronger reputations vis-à-vis all potential customers. However, somewhat 
surprisingly, we find that introducing full information has no effect — neither with nor 
without competition.  
 
1  Similar games have previously been used to investigate issues of trust by GÜTH, OCKENFELS, and WENDEL 
(1997), BOHNET, FREY and HUCK (2001), ANDERHUB, ENGELMANN, and GÜTH (2002), BOLTON, KATOK, and 
OCKENFELS (2004), BOHNET and HUCK (2004), and BOHNET, HARMGART, HUCK, and TYRAN (2005). The 
binary structure of the game lends itself to a much simpler interpretation than the continuous “investment 
game” popularized by BERG, DICKHAUT, and MCCABE (1995). 
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While we find very strong effects of competition and very little effect of improved 
possibilities for reputation building, it is worthwhile to note that in our environment (where 
prices are fixed) some reputation is necessary for competition. In the absence of any 
information about sellers’ histories, a buyer’s choice of seller would necessarily be random 
and competition would, hence, be meaningless. Indeed, in our environment competition takes 
place via reputations. In some sense, this makes our second finding that the strength or 
richness of reputations has no effect on market outcomes more remarkable. 
The effect of different forms of feedback information, i.e., the information subjects have 
about the past, has been studied in a small set of previous experiments. DUFFY and FELTOVICH 
(2002, 2006) study how information about previous-round behavior affects play in 2x2 games 
and compare such information about the past with (cheap talk) promises about the future. 
Unpredicted by theory, both double efficiency levels in prisoners’ dilemma games. In the 
context of trust games, feedback mechanisms and reputation building have been studied by 
KESER (2002) and BOLTON, KATOK, and OCKENFELS (2004). Both studies show that the 
provision of feedback about sellers’ past has substantial positive effects on efficiency. Similar 
observations are made by BOHNET and HUCK (2004) who study changes in informational 
institutions as well as by BOHNET, HARMGART, HUCK, and TYRAN (2005) who examine how 
sellers can learn the benefits of reputation building from each other. However, all these 
studies employ exogenous matching schemes and do not touch the issue of competition.3
Experiments with endogenous matching are quite rare.4 PAGE, PUTTERMAN, and UNEL 
(2005) study endogenous group formation in symmetric public good games. Knowing past 
average contributions subjects could ever so often express preferences about with whom they 
would like to play which were then fed into a matching algorithm. Endogenous matching led 
to sorting of subjects and significantly increased contributions and efficiency.5 In CORICELLI, 
2 Knowledge of sellers’ identities requires essentially that sellers have the same name in all periods. Notice 
also that if sellers’ names were changing, choice and random matching would effectively be the same. 
3  Varying feedback information has also been used to study different learning rules. See, for example, HUCK, 
NORMANN, and OECHSSLER (1999) and OFFERMAN, POTTERS, and SONNEMANS (2002) for Cournot games; 
HUCK, NORMANN, and OECHSSLER (2000) for price competition; and DUFFY and HOPKINS (2005) for market 
entry games. 
4  Of course, one might view double auctions as games with endogenous matching (to exchange a good) in 
which case the literature would be vast. However, we have in mind a narrower class of settings where prior 
to playing a well-defined n-player game, agents decide with whom they want to play this game. See 
JACKSON and WATTS (2005) for a theoretical approach to this class of games.  
5  An earlier study on endogenous group formation in public good games is EHRHART and KESER (1999). 
There, however, the choice of partners is indirect since subjects choose locations (“islands”) where they want 
to play and all subjects choosing the same location form then a group. 
 FEHR, and FELLNER (2004) partners for playing 2-player public good games were auctioned 
off. Despite free riders often making high bids for getting the right to play with cooperators, 
overall efficiency increased. In BOHNET and KÜBLER (2005) subjects could bid for playing in 
an “improved” version of a prisoners’ dilemma where costs of unilateral cooperation were 
reduced. This, too, led to some sorting and, at least initially, higher rates of cooperation in the 
prisoners’ dilemma with insurance. Finally, there is a small set of papers studying 
experiments on endogenous network formation where subjects form links to play 
subsequently some simple games with all their “neighbors” (see DECK and JOHNSON (2004), 
CALLANDER and PLOTT (2005), FALK and KOSFELD (2003), CORBAE and DUFFY (2004), RIEDL 
and ULE (2002), and KOSFELD (2004) for a survey). The paper that is most closely related to 
ours is RIEDL and ULE who show, quite similarly, to PAGE et al. that voluntary association 
improves efficiency in dilemma games.6 However, none of these studies examines trust games 
nor are there any investigations into the interaction of different matching and information 
structures, i.e., the interaction of competition and reputation. 
The theory on reputation building that goes back to SCHELLING (1960) and was formally 
developed in seminal contributions by KREPS and WILSON (1982) and KREPS, MILGROM, 
ROBERTS, and WILSON (1982) is by now well understood and it is obvious how the presence 
of feedback information enables trust as an equilibrium phenomenon in such models. There is 
far less theory about endogenous matching of agents to play games. Most of the network 
literature has focused on a reduced-form approach where the value of links between neighbors 
is immediately given through a value function that maps network configurations into payoffs. 
Exceptions include studies of network formation in coordination games (JACKSON and WATTS 
(2002), DROSTE, GILLES, and JOHNSON (2003), and GOYAL and VEGA-REDONDO (2005)) and 
dilemma games (GHOSH and RAY (1996) and ROB and YANG (2005)). More general classes of 
non-cooperative games are studied in a recent paper by JACKSON and WATTS (2005) who 
introduce the notion of “social games”. They use a non-cooperative approach to study the 
interaction once a match has been formed, but rely on cooperative methods to analyze the 
stability of matches.  
                                                 
6  There is also a literature on buyer-seller networks (theoretically developed by KRANTON and MINEHART 
(2001)). While this sounds as if it should be related to our study it is, in essence, not since there the network 
as such changes cost structures while in our study the underlying game itself is never affected by the choice 
of partners. 
 3
 While we do not attempt a detailed formal analysis of the game we implement in the 
experiment, some observations are straightforward. As mentioned above, the basic game is a 
binary 2-player trust game where the first mover (the buyer) can either buy or not. If he 
decides to buy, the second mover (the seller) chooses whether to deliver high or low quality. 
This game has a unique Nash equilibrium where the seller would deliver low quality and the 
buyer does not buy. This no-trade result remains robust if the game is repeated finitely many 
times, without the need to invoke subgame perfection. Indeed, any Nash equilibrium of the 
finitely repeated trust game entails no trade in all periods. This is due to the fact that there is 
no way for the buyer to reward the seller for high quality along the equilibrium path. The 
same holds true in our experimental version with random matching. In this setup there is one 
further type of outcome though that needs to be considered, the outcome where a seller has no 
buyer because at least one seller was matched with two buyers. We decided to make this the 
worst outcome for the seller. The economic justification for this is that sellers might carry a 
number of products, the experience good that is at the core of our study, and some other 
goods of obvious quality that the consumer purchases on the way, regardless of whether he 
buys the experience good. Without competition, the possibility that sellers might face an 
empty store does not affect the equilibrium outcome. Again, there is no trade in all periods 
since buyers still cannot reward sellers for having chosen high quality in the past. 
Things change dramatically when competition is introduced. Even without incomplete 
information and reputation building there are now subgame perfect equilibria with trade. The 
reason for this is that buyers can now reward sellers for high quality, simply by choosing them 
again. The (credible) promise to return to a seller can induce sufficiently high incentives for 
sellers to choose high quality.7 However, the no-trade equilibria do not disappear. They co-
exist and are also subgame perfect. 
In the experiment, of course, subjects are able to move to better outcomes and our 
analysis of patterns of individual play suggests that they do indeed understand the equilibrium 
mechanics of rewarding high-quality sellers with repeat custom. 
                                                 
7  The total trade volume that can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium depends, of course, on the 
exact specification of payoff parameters. 
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 2. Experimental Design 
Section 2.1 introduces the binary-choice trust game used in all treatments of our 
experiment. Section 2.2 describes our experimental design and procedures. 
2.1 The trust game 
We consider a binary-choice trust game with two players as shown in Figure 1. The first 
mover (A, the buyer) chooses between “Y” (buy, trust) and “X” (don’t buy, don’t trust). After 
“Y”, i.e., if being trusted, the second mover (B, the seller) can choose between “right” (honor 
trust, choose high quality) and “left” (exploit trust, choose low quality).  
The payoffs were chosen to reflect a conflict of interest: buyers prefer high quality over 
low quality (30 > 5) but it is cheaper for sellers to provide low quality (50 > 25, see Figure 1). 
While buyers prefer not to buy over getting low quality (20 > 5), sellers would rather provide 
high quality than not selling at all (25 > 15). Payoffs are intentionally asymmetric to create a 
difficult moral hazard problem.8 Assuming that subjects maximize their own monetary 
income, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium in which the buyer does not trust and the 
seller does not honor trust if being trusted.  
Figure 1: The trust game 
A
 X Y 
B 
A: 20 points 
B: 15 points 
left right
                       
A:  5 points 
B: 50 points 
A: 30 points
B: 25 points
 
Notice that, as long as the buyer trusts, the sum of payoffs is maximal. Only the 
distribution of payoffs depends on the sellers’ quality choice. Nevertheless, we shall in what 
                                                 
8  With symmetric payoffs subjects find it much easier to achieve efficiency already in one-shot games (see, for 
example, BACHARACH, GUERRA, and ZIZZO (2004) or BOLTON, KATOK, and OCKENFELS (2004)). 
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 follows refer to (Y, right), the outcome with successful trade, as “the efficient outcome” as 
both the buyer and the seller are better off with a high-quality trade than without trade.9
In an earlier study, BOHNET, HARMGART, HUCK, and TYRAN (2005) examined the same 
game, always with one-on-one random matching. They found that the payoffs are such that 
when sellers cannot be identified (since they do not have labels), i.e., in the absence of any 
information about the history, trust and honor rates are extremely low. In their “NoInfo” 
treatment subjects reach efficient trade in only 5% of all cases. Hence, the game serves as an 
extremely good benchmark to examine the effect of various institutional aspects designed to 
overcome the moral hazard problem. We replicate BOHNET et al.’s finding in our control 
treatment achieving an efficiency level of 8%. 
2.2 Experimental Design and Procedures 
In all treatment conditions, the following basic structure is implemented. The stage-game 
described in the previous section is repeated 30 times, and this is announced at the beginning 
of the experiment. Subjects are either a buyer or a seller for the entire experiment. A market 
consists of eight participants: 4 buyers and 4 sellers.  
Treatments differ in two dimensions: the information structure and the matching 
procedure (see Table 1). Matching can be exogenous (with each buyer being randomly 
assigned to a seller in each round) or endogenous (with buyers choosing sellers in each 
round).10 We refer to the latter treatments as the treatments “with competition” since sellers 
compete for buyers or market shares in this case. We also vary the amount of information 
buyers obtain about sellers’ past. In the absence of information about seller identity and, 
hence, their history, reputation formation is not possible and buyers cannot make a 
meaningful choice among buyers in this case (see treatment control in Table 1). With “private 
information” (pi in Table 1) all subjects (buyers and sellers) are only informed about their 
own past: in each period they can access a complete history of their own past interactions. 
With “full information” (fi in Table 1), all subjects have access to the history of all sellers in 
the market. In both treatments, feedback information about the past was provided by a visual 
                                                 
9  This can be viewed as short for “the unique individually rational efficient outcome”, as individual rationality 
would be violated in (Y, left) where the buyer would clearly prefer to have played X instead. 
10 Buyers always had to choose a seller even if they did not want to buy at all. This was just for convenient 
interface design (see below) and to keep expected payoffs in case of no trust constant across treatments. 
However, we shall interpret the choice of any particular seller, combined with the decision not to buy, simply 
as the decision not to buy from any seller. 
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 interface using colored hash (#) signs to summarize outcomes in a “history window”.11 This 
window shows four columns of hash (#) signs, each column representing one seller and each 
row representing one period.12 Initially, each column consists of thirty white hash signs. Then, 
period by period, hash signs change their color according to what happens in the game: a hash 
turns grey if a subject did not receive any information about a particular seller in the previous 
period, it turns black if a seller had a non-trusting buyer, it turns red if a seller had at least one 
buyer and chose low quality, and, finally, it turns green if a seller had at least one buyer and 
chose high quality.13 In case a transaction occurred in the treatments with full information, 
(red or green) hash signs were followed by a positive number indicating how many buyers 
had chosen this seller. 
Table 1: Treatments 
 no competition competition 
full information fi-nc fi-c 
private information pi-nc pi-c 
no information control  
 
Note that with both matching procedures sellers can have between zero and four buyers 
in each period. But sellers can only choose one quality level, i.e., they cannot discriminate 
between different buyers to keep the experiment simple.14 A seller’s total payoff in a 
particular period is the sum of payoffs that results from interacting with all his buyers. If a 
seller does not have a buyer in a period, his payoff in that period is zero. Buyers can have at 
most one interaction per period and earn the payoffs shown in Figure 1.  
The sequence of actions is as follows. Depending on the matching procedure, buyers are 
either assigned to a seller or choose one at the beginning of each period. Then, buyers choose 
to buy or not. Sellers learn how many buyers have chosen them as well as how many decided 
to buy from them. Next, sellers have to decide about the quality of the good, provided they 
have at least one buyer. At the end of each period, buyers who decided to buy are informed 
                                                 
11 See Appendix B for examples of screenshots. 
12 In the private information treatments, sellers see only one column in the history window, the one 
representing their own history. 
13 Our suggestive color coding serves the purpose of making the complex history information easy to read. Of 
course, their might have been problems with color-blind subjects but fortunately there were none. 
14 Also, since sellers cannot identify buyers, discrimination would not make much sense.  
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 about the choice of their seller and the resulting payoff, while sellers are simply reminded of 
the number of buyers who bought from them, their own choice, and the resulting payoff.  
The experiment was conducted in the experimental laboratory at the University of Erfurt. 
All sessions were computerized and the experimental software was developed with 
FISCHBACHER’s (1999) z-Tree. In total, 336 students of various fields participated in the 
experiment. Every subject only participated in one session. Subjects were recruited over the 
internet.15 Before the start of the experiment, subjects received written instructions.16 The 
language was kept neutral. Neither did we use terms like “trust” or “trustworthiness”, nor 
terms like “buyer” and “seller.” Instead, “A”-participants had to choose between “X” and “Y” 
and “B”-participants could decide between “left” and “right”, as labeled in the game tree 
shown in Figure 1. All subjects correctly answered a series of control questions before we 
started the experiment.  
We ran three (two) sessions per main treatment (in the control treatment), each with 24 
subjects, in three markets of 8 subjects. Thus, we have 9 independent markets in the main 
treatments, and 6 markets in the control treatment. Subjects earned 14.08 Euros on average 
within 60 to 90 minutes, including a lump sum depending on their role in the experiment.17  
 
3. Results 
We begin our discussion of results by examining some descriptive statistics of aggregate 
play. We then proceed by describing some aspects of the dynamics and close with a brief 
analysis of how individual reputations affect behavior. 
Table 2 shows in the upper part the average trust rate (i.e. the percentage of cases in 
which buyers chose to buy), the average honor rate (i.e. the percentage of cases in which 
sellers provided high quality) and the average efficiency rate (i.e. the percentage of cases in 
which buyers trust sellers and sellers deliver high quality) for each treatment aggregated over 
all 30 rounds. The two rightmost columns show average earnings per period for buyers and 
sellers, respectively. 
                                                 
15  We used GREINER’s (2004) ORSEE. 
16  A translation of the instructions can be found in Appendix A.  
17  Buyers received fewer points than sellers to guarantee that sellers who did not very often interact with buyers 
got a reasonable payoff.  
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 In the treatment control, trust and honor rates are low (28%), and, as a consequence, the 
efficiency rate is at a meager 8%.18 Per-period earnings are low for both buyers and sellers. 
Average buyer earnings are 17.7, which is even below the outside option since the buyers 
who trust get low quality most of the time. This treatment generates an outcome that is quite 
close to the game theoretical prediction of no trade and is in line with earlier findings.19
Table 2: Overview of aggregated results 
 trust rate honor rate20 efficiency rate buyer earnings seller earnings 
control 
0.28 
(0.09) 
0.28 
(0.15) 
0.08 
(0.04) 
17.7 
(1.23) 
23.0 
(2.79) 
pi-nc 
0.50 
(0.12) 
0.72 
(0.08) 
0.36 
(0.11) 
21.5 
(1.20) 
23.5 
(1.86) 
fi-nc 
0.51 
(0.16) 
0.73 
(0.16) 
0.37 
(0.19) 
21.6 
(2.54) 
23.6 
(1.48) 
pi-c 
0.86 
(0.08) 
0.92 
(0.05) 
0.79 
(0.07) 
26.8 
(1.03) 
25.4 
(1.65) 
fi-c 0.90 (0.07) 
0.94 
(0.03) 
0.85 
(0.07) 
27.7 
(0.90) 
25.3 
(0.95) 
Effect of competition 
fi-c vs fi-nc p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.012 
pi-c vs pi-nc p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.031 
Effect of information 
control vs pi-nc p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.012 
fi-c vs pi-c p = 0.115 p = 0.149 p = 0.032 p = 0.033 p = 0.281 
fi-nc vs pi-nc p = 0.490 p = 0.441 p = 0.475 p = 0.475 p  = 0.390 
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. The p-values refer to treatment differences according to Mann-Whitney U-tests 
(one-tailed). 
With private information (pi-nc), market outcomes are much better than in control. In 
comparison to control, the trust rate almost doubles (50%), the honor rate more than doubles 
(72%), and the efficiency rate more than quadruples (36%). The possibility of reputation 
formation benefits both buyers and sellers. Average payoffs are significantly higher for both 
                                                 
18  Note that the trust rate is the percentage of times “Y” was chosen (= #Y/(#X + #Y)), the honor rate is 
percentage of “right” given that a buyer chose “Y” (= #“right”/#”Y”). The efficiency rate is the percentage 
of all choices that end in the lower right node of Figure 1, and is therefore the product of the two other rates 
(= #“right”/ (#X + #Y)). 
19  As mentioned earlier, Bohnet et al.’s (2005) “NoInfo” treatment is – except for the matching procedure – the 
same as control here. They find for UK-subjects a trust rate of 21%, a honor rate of 19%, and an efficiency 
rate of 5%. 
20 The reported honor rate weighs according to the number of buyers a seller had in a given period. Thus, if a 
seller had  buyers he is considered as being trustworthy n-times. However, results do not change much 
without this weighting: fi-c 0.94, fi-nc 0.73, pi-c 0.89, pi-nc 0.73. 
4≤n
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 types according to Mann-Whitney U-tests. In fact, the treatment differences between control 
and pi-nc are highly significant for all measures (see the bottom part of Table 2). 
What is the effect of having full information rather than private information in the 
absence of competition? Surprisingly, there is no effect. The aggregate results in treatment fi-
nc are almost identical to pi-nc on all accounts.  
On the other hand, the effect of competition is very powerful. Given private information, 
competition boosts the trust rate from 50 to 86% and the honor rate from 72 to 92%. As a 
consequence, the efficiency rate more than doubles from 36 to 79% (compare pi-nc and pi-c 
in Table 2). Buyers benefit strongly from competition. Their flexible earnings (i.e. earnings in 
excess of the minimum of 5 per period) increase by 32% (from 16.5 to 21.8). But, amazingly, 
sellers also benefit from competition. Their flexible earnings21 increase by 47% (from 11.3 to 
16.6). Sellers benefit from competition since it helps to overcome the moral hazard problem 
straining all agents. 
The effects of competition are equally impressive given full information: The trust rate is 
at 90% in fi-c rather than 51% in fi-nc, and the honor rate is at 94% in fi-c rather than 73% in 
fi-nc. The efficiency rate is boosted from 37% in fi-nc to 85% in fi-c. Effects on earnings are 
also similar to the partial information case.  
Providing full information in a competitive market has a weak effect at best. A 
comparison of the 4th and 5th line in Table 2 shows that the levels are overall similar. 
According to Mann-Whitney U-tests, the efficiency rate and buyer earnings are weakly 
significantly higher with full information, while the other rates and seller earnings are not.  
Overall, competition and information together more than triple the trust and honor rates, 
and improve efficient high-quality trade by a factor of 10 compared to the control treatment. 
Approximately half of this overall effect can be attributed to providing market participants 
with some (i.e. private) information, allowing them to build and observe reputations, while 
the other half can be attributed to competition. However, providing more than private (i.e. 
full) information and, thus, increasing market transparency, yields weak improvements at 
best. Apparently, full information is not necessary for these markets to provide good results. 
                                                 
21  Sellers fixed expected earnings under random matching are computed by taking into consideration that each 
buyer is assigned with probability ¼ to each seller. A seller’s minimal payoff from a match is 15. In 
expectation, the fixed income component under random matching is 10.25. 
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 Market outcomes over time 
Figure 2 shows that average trust rates start out at similar levels of around 50% in all 
treatments. Over the next 10 periods, however, remarkable differences between some 
treatments are observed. In the two treatments with competition (marked with triangles), trust 
rates increase to around 90%, while they remain at around 50% in the two treatments without 
competition (marked with squares). In the control treatment (marked with circles and a dotted 
line), trust falls slightly, to approximately 40%, by period 10. Over the rest of the game, these 
trends become more pronounced. In treatments with competition, trust rates further increase 
to reach almost 100%, in the treatments without competition a weakly declining trend is 
apparent, and in control the trust rates fall further to around 10%. Endgame effects occur 
literally in the last period only, and are most pronounced in the treatments with competition. 
Figure 2 also illustrates the fact that there was essentially no difference between private and 
full information. In fact, the two lines with triangles and the two lines with squares exhibit 
almost identical dynamic properties, respectively. 
Figure 2: Average trust rates over time 
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Figure 3 shows average honor rates over time and provides a somewhat noisier picture 
than Figure 2. The reason is that the denominator of this rate (i.e. number of times buyers 
choose to trust) is small in the treatments without competition. Taking this into consideration, 
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 we note the following: Honor rates start out high, at levels of 70 to 90% in all treatments 
except control. These high initial levels of trustworthiness are remarkable given the relatively 
low levels of trust of around 50% shown in Figure 2. Possible explanations for these 
comparatively low rates of trust are that buyers underestimate the sellers’ trustworthiness or, 
in the treatments with full information, want to free-ride on other buyers’ experience in the 
first few periods of the game. In treatments with competition (see lines with triangles in 
Figure 3), the honor rates increase even further to reach values of close to or at 100% in the 
second half of the experiment. Notice, however, that some of this remarkable increase in 
trustworthiness is simply a consequence of selection as, with identifiability of sellers, less 
trustworthy sellers are trusted less often.  
Figure 3: Average honor rates over time 
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It is only in the last (and next to last) period, where we observe pronounced endgame 
effects. In fact, the honor rate in the very last period is 5% in fi-c and exactly zero in pi-c. In 
the treatments without competition, honor rates are more fickle throughout but essentially 
remain at the initial level until close to end of the game. In control, however, honor rates 
decline after period 8 and are essentially zero over the last 10 periods.  
Overall, the possibility of reputation building (i.e. the provision of private information) 
has a more pronounced effect on the average honor rate than on the trust rate, while 
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 competition seems to have a stronger effect on the trust rate than on the honor rate (compare 
Figures 2 and 3). 
Figure 4 shows efficiency rates and provides a very clear and easy to interpret picture. 
Efficiency rates start out at similar levels of around 30 to 50% in the four main treatments. 
But a separation occurs quickly. In treatments with competition, efficiency rates increase 
steadily to reach levels of around 90 to 100%. In the last third of the experiment, the treatment 
with full information and competition seems to outperform the one with private information, 
as there is a consistent gap of about 10 percentage points (Mann-Whitney U-test: fi-c vs. pi-c: 
0.000, one-tailed). No such difference due to the level of information is apparent in treatments 
without competition. The two lines marked with squares in Figure 4 are essentially identical, 
and reveal no increasing trend over time. In the control treatment, efficiency is low, at around 
10 to 20% in the first half, and falls to essentially zero in the last third of the game.  
Figure 4: Average efficiency rates over time 
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Figure 4 very clearly demonstrates that the combined effect of reputation and competition 
is dramatic. The combined effect literally makes the difference between a rate of zero and 
100% efficiency in the last third of the game (compare control and fi-c in Figure 4). The 
figure also shows that a bit less than half of this impressive combined effect is due to the 
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 availability of private information (vs. control), and a bit more than half of the combined 
effect is due to competition. 
The role of reputations 
From what has been said above, it is evident that providing minimal (private) information 
to build some reputation considerably improves market performance compared to anonymous 
markets, and that competition for buyers massively improves market performance, both, with 
private and full information. The reason why we expect reputations to be effective in raising 
market efficiency and expect competition to multiply these effects is that buyers follow 
specific behavioral rules. If buyers systematically shop from sellers with a clean past and shun 
sellers with a history involving low quality, sellers have an incentive to invest in and maintain 
a good reputation, at least in early periods of the game. The existence of such a behavioral 
pattern necessitates that buyers extrapolate sellers’ behavior into the future. That is, they take 
a seller’s history as an indicator of his future trustworthiness. 
In order to investigate both these issues we run two simple regressions. The first simply 
investigates whether good reputations do indeed drive consumers’ choices to buy. Focusing 
on the full information treatments we regress the buyer’s choice whether to trust or not on the 
average honor rate of the seller so far (greenshare), a competition dummy (equal to one in fi-
c) and an interaction term of these two variables. The second regression investigates whether 
high quality choices in the past are a reliable indicator for high quality in the future, simply by 
regressing the seller’s quality choice on the same set of variables. Estimation results for linear 
probability models (with clustering on the matching group level) are shown in Table 3. 
Probits give identical results. 
The estimation results confirm our intuition. A seller’s average quality in the past is a 
good predictor for both, a buyer’s trust and the seller’s next quality choice. In fi-c buyers 
react a little less sensitively to variations in past quality but trust generally more. However, 
the second regression shows that past quality predicts future quality equally well in both full 
information treatments. (Similar results are obtained for treatments with partial information.) 
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    Table 3: Regression results in treatments with full information 
 
dependent variable:  
buyer’s trust 
dependent variable:  
seller’s high quality choice 
variable coefficient std. error coefficient std. error 
greenshare 0.669*** 0.081 0.689*** 0.057 
competition 0.573** 0.131 0.314 0.117 
greenshare*competition -0.447* 0.143 -0.096 0.143 
constant 0.130* 0.049 -0.014 0.023 
 
 
matching groups:  9 
observations:   2,015 
R2  0.383 
matching groups:  9 
observations:   2,015 
R2  0.439 
***   p ≤ 0.001,   **   p ≤ 0.01,   *   p ≤ 0.05 
The regressions nicely illustrate the role of reputations. Sellers have a strong incentive to 
invest in good reputations as this generates repeat custom. But once sellers have a good 
reputation they also face the temptation of exploiting it at some stage. Ceteris paribus, this 
temptation is much stronger when there are more customers in a seller’s store and, in the 
absence of competition, we do find that average quality dramatically falls in crowded stores. 
In the presence of competition, however, we find that this reversed. If buyers can choose from 
whom they want to buy in the future, the costs of alienating many buyers overcompensate for 
the increased temptation. Table 4 shows average rip-off rates (i.e. the percentage of cases in 
which sellers provided low quality) for sellers with up to or more than two sellers. The effects 
of competition are dramatic. With competition, buying in crowded stores is tremendously 
safe. In the absence of competition, on the other hand, buying in crowded stores is a terrible 
idea. Our guess is that this pattern could also be nicely tested in the field. Crowded stores at 
market places mainly frequented by locals (who actually chose to buy in these stores) may 
function quite differently from crowded stores at market places frequented by tourists (who 
more or less randomly picked a seller). 
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 Table 4: Average rip-off rates dependent on the number of customers 
 number of customers 
 1 or 2 3 or 4 
fi-c 0.06 0.05 
pi-c 0.11 0.01 
fi-nc 0.26 0.35 
pi-nc 0.26 0.51 
Customer loyalty and competition  
When buyers can choose from whom to buy customer loyalty becomes an issue. In 
general, we find that buyers tended to be very loyal. To provide a measure of customer 
loyalty, we calculate for each buyer the longest uninterrupted sequence of interaction with the 
same seller. On average, these sequences extend through more than half of the game in both 
information conditions (fi-c 16.47, and pi-c 15.89 periods), much longer than the 
corresponding value resulting from random matching (fi-nc 2.36 and pi-nc 2.11). 
We find that competition for buyers is a discipline device because buyers systematically 
reward and sanction sellers for their past behavior in their own interaction. For example, the 
average buyer remains loyal to a seller if he sold him high quality in the previous period in 
72% of the cases in both fi-c and pi-c. In contrast, after having received low quality, buyers 
always switch to another seller in fi-c and do so 79% of the time in pi-c.  
While buyers shun sellers who have disappointed them, we next ask whether buyers are 
tempted to switch to sellers with particularly good reputations. It turns out that they do, but 
that reputation earned in one’s own transactions is given more weight than reputation a seller 
has earned in transactions with other buyers. To illustrate, we ask how often buyers buy from 
the seller with the relatively best reputation, i.e., the seller with the highest share of green 
hashes among all sellers. While in pi-c buyers choose the seller with the best history in 78% 
of all cases, buyers do so only 59% of the time in fi-c. This highly significant difference 
(Mann-Whitney U-test: fi-c vs. pi-c: 0.016, one-tailed) is startling. Why do buyers have less 
trust in the available information in treatment fi-c? The answer can be found by computing 
how often buyers in fi-c bought from the seller with whom they themselves made the best 
experience. Specifically, we compute how often a buyer in fi-c bought from the seller who has 
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 the relatively best reputation vis-à-vis this buyer. Remarkably, this number is almost identical 
to the one we found in pi-c. In 76% of all decisions buyers in fi-c buy from the seller with 
whom they had the best experience in the past (pi-c: 78%). In other words, it seems that 
buyers largely ignored the additional information they got in fi-c and simply concentrate on 
their own experience.22
Finally, we can ask how forgiving buyers were. That is, do they return to a seller who 
provided them with low quality? It turns out that buyers are more forgiving in fi-c than in pi-
c. In fi-c, 50.0% (17/34) of the buyers “forgive” a seller for having provided them with low 
quality at some point (if they return, this happens after 9.9 periods on average). In pi-c, buyers 
return in only 25.0% (16/64) of the cases (after 5.4 periods on average). This finding indicates 
that buyers made some use of other buyers’ experience. A seller is more likely to “get a 
second chance” after providing a buyer with low quality if this buyer can observe that the 
seller provided high quality to other buyers. This, of course, is only possible in treatments 
with full information. 
As a consequence of the regularities in buyers’ choices discussed above, market shares 
are quite unequal in the presence of competition. Table 5 shows average market shares of  
more and less successful firms for all four main treatments. 
Table 5: Average market shares 
 seller with the 
 highest 2nd highest 3rd highest lowest 
 market share 
fi-c 0.51 0.23 0.15 0.11 
pi-c 0.57 0.24 0.11 0.08 
fi-nc 0.32 0.26 0.23 0.19 
pi-nc 0.28 0.27 0.24 0.21 
 
In the future we also plan to study experiments where buyers can only observe market 
shares of different sellers to examine whether success can signal quality. 
                                                 
22  This overweighting of own information and/or experiences is also found in different contexts. For example, 
subjects in information cascade experiments tend to overweigh their own private signal (see, for example, 
GOEREE, PALFREY, ROGERS, and MCKELVEY (2006)). A finding that resembles our results even more is 
reported in HUCK and JEHIEL (2004) who show that subjects tend to predict other’s behavior largely based on 
own experience even when more accurate public statistics are available. 
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 4. Conclusion 
This study suggests that reputation mechanisms can greatly improve the functioning of 
markets for experience goods, and this finding is in line with the intuitions of many 
economists and with earlier experimental results. However, the effects of reputation on its 
own are limited. Only if some minimal feedback information – enabling the mechanics of 
reputation building – is coupled with competition we observe that the market-crippling moral 
hazard problem is fully overcome. 
There are a couple of surprising aspects of our findings. First, the sheer size of the 
competition effect is stunning. While, given the size of our data set, this is clearly not a fluke 
one wonders about the robustness of these results with respect to the implicit market price23 
and the precision of the feedback information. Both these questions provide obvious and 
interesting avenues for further research. Second, we find that full public information is no 
better than private experience only. While this is not very surprising in the treatments with 
competition where private information is already sufficient to reach an effective ceiling, this 
is puzzling in the random matching treatments. Clearly, delivering low quality should be more 
costly if this is observed by the entire population than just by a single customer. This is why 
we expected to observe higher efficiency levels with full information. One reason for why this 
does not happen is that buyers apparently attach a much higher weight to their own 
experience than to the experience of others, a phenomenon not limited to our study. 
The main contribution of this study is clearly to demonstrate for the first time a strong 
link between trust and competition. As discussed in the introduction, trust has been shown to 
be an important element of economic growth and lack of trust (or more generally low levels 
of social capital) can impede economic development. What we show here is that competition 
fosters trust. In our environment the efficiency gains from competition stem from this link. 
With competition, there are stronger incentives for resisting the short-term temptation of 
exploiting trading partners. And these incentives are increasing in past success. The more 
trading partners you have, the more costly a deviation. This is why in our experiments with 
competition buyers are extremely safe in crowded stores. In that sense we observe how 
success breeds success — trust being the key catalyst in this process. 
                                                 
23  In this study we have focussed on one aspect of competition, free choice of trading partners. In most markets 
this element is complemented by some form of price competition. In a follow-up study we plan to investigate 
the consequence of an additional first stage where sellers can post a price before buyers choose a seller. 
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 Appendix A: Instructions (Treatment fi-c) 
(Original instructions were in German. They are available from the authors upon request. 
In treatments with no competition A-participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
B-participants. In treatments where only partial information was provided A-participants 
could only keep track of the history of the B-participant they interacted with in a particular 
period while B-participants only knew their own history. Here, A-participants were not 
provided with the information on the number of A-participants interacting with the same B-
participant they were who chose Y.) 
 
Welcome to the experiment! 
 
Please read these instructions carefully! Do not speak to your neighbors and keep quiet 
during the entire experiment! In case you have a question raise your hand! We will then come 
to you. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment you are randomly separated into subpopulations of 8 
participants. During the experiment you solely interact with the participants of your 
subpopulation. 
 
In this experiment you will repeatedly make decisions. Doing this you can earn points. Your 
total sum of points plus a show-up fee, which is dependent on your role in the experiment, 
will be converted into Euros at the end of the experiment and paid to you in cash. The show-
up fee amounts to 150 points for A-participants and 330 points for B-participants. Following 
rule applies to the conversion of points into Euros: 
1 point = 0.015 € 
How much you earn depends on your decisions and on the decisions of other participants in 
your subpopulation. All participants receive the same instructions. All decisions are made 
anonymously. No other participant will get to know your name and your payoff.  
 
Altogether there are (in your subpopulation) eight participants. At the beginning of the 
experiment all participants are randomly assigned one of two roles (A or B) which is 
displayed on the computer screen. There are four A-participants (A1, A2, A3 and A4) and four 
B-participants (B1, B2, B3 and B4). All participants keep their role and the number assigned 
to them throughout the experiment.  
 
At the beginning of each round each A-participant chooses one of the four B-participants with 
whom he interacts in this period, this means that A-participants decide whether they want to 
interact with B1, B2, B3 or B4. Therefore, a B-participant can interact with zero to four  
A-participants in one round. This process is repeated in the next round.  
 
B-participants only learn the number of A-participants who chose them, but not who has 
chosen them.  
 
After the A-participants have chosen the B-participants, it is each A-participants turn to make 
a decision. More specifically, each A-participant has to choose between option X and Y (see 
Figure). If he picks option X, the A-participant will earn 20 points and the B-participant 
chosen by him will earn 15 points from this interaction. If he picks option Y, the payoffs 
depend on the choice of the B-participant chosen by him who has to decide whether he wants 
to go “left” of “right”. If he decides to pick “left”, the A-participant will earn 5 points and the 
 22
 B-participant will earn 50 points from this interaction. If he decides to pick “right”, the A-
participant will earn 30 points and the B-participant will earn 25 points. 
 
If a B-participant is not chosen by at least one A-participant or if all A-participants who have 
chosen him picked X, he does not have to make a decision. Otherwise the B-participant learns 
the number of A-participants who have chosen him and picked Y and has to make the same 
decision for all these A-participants, that is whether he wants to go “left” or “right” for all A-
participants. A B-participant who has not been chosen by at least one A-participant earns 0 
points. 
 
Payoffs for an A-participant and a B-participant from one interaction. 
A
 X Y
B
A: 20 points
B: 15 points
left right
                            
A:  5 points 
B: 50 points
A: 30 points
B: 25 points
(B-participants can receive payoffs from several interactions in one round.) 
The experiment consists of 30 rounds. After each round you will be informed about what has 
happened and you will be reminded of your payoff and your total sum of points so far. 
 
Moreover, all (A- and B-) participants can keep track of the entire history of B-
participants. For all participants there will be a screen depicting the history of all B-
participants. For each round and each B-participant there will be a colored little # (hash) with 
a number behind. 
• A black # indicates that the B-participant had nothing to decide because either no  
A-participant chose him or all A-participants who chose him picked X. 
• A red # indicates that the B-participant picked “left”. 
• A green # indicates that the B-participant picked “right”. 
• The integer behind the # shows the number of A-participants who picked Y after 
choosing this B-participant. 
These are the rules. Your can trust us that everything will happen exactly according to these 
rules. Take your time going over these instructions again and feel free to ask questions. But 
don’t shout! Simply raise your hand. 
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 Appendix B: Screenshot (Example: fi-c)  
A-participant’s screen 
 
B-participant’s screen 
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 Appendix B: Screenshot (Example: pi-c)  
A-participant’s screen 
 
B-participant’s screen 
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